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Kozo Kato 
1. Introduction 
The current policy making process of ]apan's foreign economic 
assistance is politically as dynamic as other foreign economic con-
cerns such as trade， finance， direct investment， and others. This pol. 
icy making process is aptly described by a variant of T.]. Pempel's 
argument that“]apanese policy making is far more complex than 
either nation ("]apan， Inc.，" or single spokesman for ]apan) would 
admit and than many of our long-standing impressions about how 
policy is formulated in ]apan can capture" (Pempel， 1987， p.272). 
The critical difference between the aid issue and other foreign eco-
nomic problems， however， lies in the fact there is no politicization 
because of high inclusivity of the aid issue. 
From the late 1950 s through the 60 s， the “]apan， Inc." model 
can be applied to explain the policy making process in aid. Foreign 
aid was one of several effective policy instruments to achieve the 
single national goal of Macro-level economic growth through the 
expansion of exports and the development of overseas natural re卸
sources. However， the ]apan，. Inc. model faced various challenges 
such as deregulation， de-bureaucritization， liberalization， interna-
tionalization， inthe wake of the slow economic growth. These chal-
lenges have politicized various kinds of issues such as social secu-
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rity， natural environment， the U，S.'-]apan Peace Treaty etc， and， as 
a result， political relations between the ruling conservatives and the 
opposition， relatiol1s with 101-]apanese actors， relations within the 
conservative camp， and the power balance among political institu-
tions have undergone a necessary transformation (Pempel， 1987， 
p.274). 
?????
Nonetheless， ]apan's aid issue has followed a different trajec-
tory than other issues. Rather than politicizing the issue in domestic 
politics， the ministries concerned， mainly the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA)， the Ministry of International Trade and lndustries 
(MITl)， and the Ministry of Finance (MOF)， were able to succeed in 
preempting political conflicts by involving traditionally indifferent 
actors 5uch a5 the mass public， labor， and late comers in the hierar-
chy of government ministries. 
This paper focuses on domestic politics， especially on the policy 
making process in the field of ]apanese foreign assistance. By fo-
cusing on domestic factors， we believe that it is possible to solve a 
politico←economic puzzle of ]apan's aid policy， which has been dis-
missed by the internationalists: Why does the aid issue rarely get 
politicized in the political process， like other foreign policies like 
trade and defense? 
Although ]apan has reacted to foreign requests by， for exam-
ple， setting the goal of doubling its amount of aid every five years 
01' 50， the aid issue never became the center of debate in the Diet. 
Parliamentarians， from both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
and the opposition parties， havejust ceremoniously approved the to-
tal amount of the ODA budget without making any questions on fu-
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ture use， inspite of the fact that the ODA budget share in Japanese 
general account equal amounts to subsidies to small and medium' 
sized enterprises， over which LDP members often confront fierce re-
sistance from opposition parties. As Kent Calder argues， Japan as a 
“reactive state" has often formulated ils foreign policies passively， 
responding to external pressures， especially from the United States， 
concerning such issues as the liberalization of trade and capital in 
the 1960 s and 70 s， the expansion of military expenditure in the 80 s， 
and the change of macro-economic policy in recent years. Foreign 
pressures have often triggered the politicization of foreign policies， 
and have contributed to breaking the domestic political stalemate 
for the sake of decisive actions. In fact， the issue of foreign eco-
nomic cooperatIon also has elicited strong demands from the United 
States for a substantial increase in J apanese contribution as a part 
of“burden sharing." Zbigniew Brzezinski， former National Security 
Adviser of the United States， proposed that“if J apan was going to 
hold its military spending far below the level of other Western 
countries， itshould increase its aid to the point at which the sum of 
the two is 4 percent of GNP" (Japan Economic ]ournal， November 
13， 1987). 
2. International Change and Domestic Continuity 
Since the Plaza Accord in September 1985 when ]apanese yen 
was abruptly and largely appreciated， many works on .Japan's for陶
eign assistance have mushroomed. As these works predicted， .Ja-
pan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) surpassed that of the 
United States in 1989 and .Japan became the largest aid donor re-
まL
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placing the U.S position held since W orld War 1. Most of the works 
on ]apan's foreign assistance since 1985 are preoccupied with the 
thought of ]apan's role in the world as the largest aid donor in eco-
nomic and strategic terms. Closely examining the quality， quantity， 
and the geographical distribution of ]apan's ODA since its start in 
1954， some argue that ]apan's ODA reflects ]apanese mercantilisti~ 
orientation judging from the fact that a major portion of it is di-
rected to Asian countries， ]apan's historical sphere of interest， and 
they conclude that ]apan is not yet a leader in international devel-
opment assistance because the global contribution is so meager 
(Rix， 1989/90). Others， focusing on the seemingly “strategic" charac-
ter of the aid， see ]apan's aid policy as a“hybrid" that reflects ]a-
pan's self interests and the forces of Realpolitik in the world system 
(Yasutomo， 1986). 
Taking a look at the ]apanese policy-making process on eco・
nomic cooperation， students of ]apanese politics have observed con-
tinuity， namely， bureaucratic complexity. A total of 19 ministries 
and agencies are currently involved. Thus it is often ~aid that the 
ability to coordinate the activities of these various organs on a uni-
fied basis is sorely lacking. According to Alan Rix，“in assessing 
]apan's program， the structure and operation of the aid system 
needs to be considered. lt is a decentralised and complex bureauc-
racy， with no single point of political responsibility‘It is poorly co-
ordinated and suffers from cumbersome procedures and tight an・
nual budget processes. ln the absence of massive political pressure， 
it is unlikely to be rationalised or reorganised" (Rix， 1987， p.2). This 
observation originates from his earlier book， the outstanding one 
???
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dealing with Japanese foreign aid from the perspective of domestic 
poIicies. In the book， he concludes that “<t>wo aspects of Japa-
nese policy making， dominated this study: the vigor of bureau-
cratic politics of aid in Japan， and the resilience of organizational 
proce田"(Rix， 1980， p.269). 
However， in terms of international comparison， this observa-
tion applies to other developed countries besides Japan. For in-
stance， Koichiro Matsuura， the former director-general of Eco-
nomic Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs， re-
sponds in an interview that “people have suggested， for instance， 
that we follow the U.S. example of drawing up aid programs by re-
cipient and submitting them separately to the National Diet for its 
approval. But the United States is the only donor that employs this 
practice" (Keizai Koho Center， 1989， p.14). Most major OECD coun-
tries are conducting their own aid programs through complicated， 
seemingly bureaucracy-led institutions: In the United States， three 
departments--State， Treasury， Agriculture-are in charge of poIicy 
formulation for foreign economic assistance under presidential con働
trol， and seven agencies are involved in implementing poIicy; Great 
Britain endows discretionary power with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and London Chamber of Commerce， and there exist six im-
plementing agencies; Germany has the Ministry of Economic Coop-
eration， a speciaIized governmental organization in charge of for-
eign economic assistance， while there are also six agencies involved 
at the administrative level; France is said to have出emost compIi-
cated aid structure involving almost al French Ministries and 
Agencies Iike Japan (APIC. 1988， pp. 1-11). Therefore in compari-
五
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son with other advanced countries， we cannot describe ]apan's aid 
system as particularly bureaucracy-dominant， just because the sys-
tem consists of three ministries and one agency--Foreign Affairs， 
International Trade and Industry， Finance， and Economic Planning 
Agency--as a decision making body， and the total of more than ten 
other ministries and governmental organizations are involved its or-
ganization. 
In fact， a single focal point cannot play a dominant role in 
modern' mammoth bureaucracy in the field of aid. As Barbara 
Crane's study shows， there was trans-governmental coalitions 
among like-minded bureaucrats to make members who have weak 
sub-units in national systems commit themselves to the agreement 
of international debt relief initiative. In her study， Germany， which 
has one single responsible organization for economic cooperation， 
needed U.K. 's back up to convince German Ministry of Finance of 
the necessity of international debt relief (Crane， 1985). Foreign eco・
nomic assistance is such an inter-sectoral issue involving national 
budget， security， diplomacy etc. that it is not possible for one or-
ganization to handle with ful responsibility. In the following， we 
will examine how the ]apanese aid system has involved various 
governmental organizations during its historical evolution in order 
to implement specific policy goals in respective periods. 
五 3.Bureaucracy Dominant? 
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Our consideration of the historical evolution of ]apan's aid 
from its onset through the 1990 s willlead us to the concept of high 
incluslvity of the issue. Ministries concerned， mainly the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs (MOF A)， the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI)， and the Ministry of Finance (MOF)， have made it 
possible to keep the issue of foreign economic policy from becoming 
politicized precisely by inc1uding al political actors such as politi司
cians， private business， the people， and the labor. It is a myth that 
the policy making process in the aid issue is a state-!ed， one domi-
nated by the bureaucracy. 
Japan's ODA started with its participation in the Colombo Plan 
and the signing of the Reparation Treaty with Burma in 1954. ODA 
to01王theform of grants mostly as reparations， and the geographical 
distribution naturally focused on Asia to compensate for the Japa-
nese military invasion of South East Asia during World War I
(Kaneko， 1987， p.48). Since Japan's attitude toward the capital 
transfer was to avoid involvement in the internal policies in recipi-
ent countries， we may find the origin of Japan's basic aid philoso-
phy， which persists today as the “request principle (yosei-shugi)" 
(Hasegawa， 1989， pp.2-3). It is obvious， in this first stage of aid evo-
lution， that the MOF A took initiatives to reach a diplomatic settle-
ment on the amount of reparation with the Asian countries. Since 
then， MOF A has dominated the sphere of grant aid among various 
ODA components. 
The devotion of aid to diplomatic priorities changed in 1958 
when Japan started to extend the first economic development loan 
to India “<s>ince then development loans have become the major 
component of Japanese aid and its main purpose was to provide 
manufacturing plants and machinery. During the 1950 s and 60 s， Ja-
pan undertook the reconstruction and industrialization of its econ-
五
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omy. It had a strong need for measures designed to promote eco-
nomic expansion that was required to support its growing industrial 
base. As a result ]apan's aid during this period was characterized 
by efforts to promote exports" (Hasegawa， 1989， p.3). ]apan's for-
eign aid after 1958 was one of several important policy instruments 
to achieve a policy objective of macro-Ievel economic growth 
through various foreign economic policies， such as the expansion of 
exports， the development of foreign markets， the protection of do-
mestic iudustries， and others 
Following the change in aid objectives from reparation to do-
mestic macro-economic growth， many organizations for adminis-
trating ODA sprang up since 1958. The South East Asian Develop-
ment Cooperation Fund was founded in 1958 as cooperation organi-
zation inside the Export司ImportBank of ]apan. The fund was sepa-
rated from the Bank and established as the Overseas Economic Co-
operation Fund (OECF) in 1961. As for technical cooperation， the 
International Technical Cooperation Agency was founded along 
with the Institute of Developing Economies followed in 1959 by the 
International Training Association for Technology (Kaneko， 1987， 
pp.48-50). It is this period when the fundamental structure of ]a-
pan's ODA was established through fierce competition among 
MOF A， MOF， and MITI to catch up with the rapid evolution of aid. 
However， since MITI played a critical role for orienting ]apanese 
business in expanding exports during this period， we can assume 
that MITI's influence was relatively stronger over aid than the 
other two ministries. MITI could maintain dense policy networks 
with industries concerned through administrative guidance， while 
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お10Fcould not define its constituency， because the banking sector's 
capitaI was too scarce to mobiIize as co-financing loans to develop-
ing countries. Needless to say， MOFA's authority declined in the aid 
arena with the rise of the economic poIicy objective. 
Having achieved high economic growth over the 1960 s， Japan， 
as one of the Western aIies， came under strong external pressures 
to comply with international rules and obligations and to assume 
responsibilities commensurate with its power. In the aid area，“the 
criticism of export--promotion bias of J apanese aid and program be-
gan to increase. At the same time， an international consensus was 
built against tying procurement conclitions to the provision of aicl. . . 
In 1972， Japan extended its first untieclloan， and in 1978 it officiaIIy 
declarecl its support for the principle of the untied aid development 
loans except in a few special cases" (Hasegawa， 1989， p.4). Never-
theless， this change in the international environment did not cause 
transformation of MITI-dominating aid regime. The oiI crisis of 
1973-74 made Japanese policy makers aware of the seriousness of 
economic security of the state. Thereafter， the development-cum--
import strategy， that is， to provide foreign aid to develop natural 
resources of developing countries and to secure raw material 
sources for imports to Japan， became the main objective of aid. As 
a ministry in charge of expanding trade ancl securing energy and 
raw materials for industries， MITI coulclmaintain its influence over 
the manner of implementation of Japanese foreign economic assis-
tance. 
In the late 1970 s， Japan began to redefine its aicl objective in 
terms of its overaII foreign policy， taking the provision of aid to be 
??
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part of the cost of maintaining the country's “comprehensive secu-
rity，" the term which was first addressed by Prime Minister Ohira 
in 1980. 1n the wake of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan， the Japanese government stepped up its aid to neighbor-
ing Pakistan. It also started building its a&sistance to Thailand and 
Turkey， which it similarly defined as a country bordering areas of 
conflict. And in 1981， itdeclared its intention to strengthen its as-
sistance to those areas which are important to the maintenance of 
the peace and stability of the world (Inada， 1988， p.95). This policy 
shift in the distribution of aid can be characterized by Kent Calder's 
concept of the “reactive state，" a policy stance especially endorsed 
by MOFA which regards U.S.-Japan relationship as an axis of 
J apanese foreign policy. 恥10FA believed that the increase in for-
eign aic1 to those areas which are important to the maintenance of 
the peace and stability of the world， as a part of burden sharing 
with Western allies， effectively contributed to strengthening the re噌
lationship‘ The new security environment that stemmed from the 
transition from the phase of the first detente to that o! the second 
cold war forced Japan to give up its f1irtation with neutralism as 
embodied in the concept of“omni -directional diplomacy." With the 
justification of new concept of comprehensive security， itforced Ja-
pan to make a seemingly clear-cut contribution to the world peace 
and security under the U.S. -Japan military treaty. This period cor-
responds to the first ODA doubling plan from 1978 to 1980. This 
ODA effort raisec1 Japan's ODA/GNP ratio from 0.20 percent in 
1976， to 0.32 percent in 1980. We may calI this period the revival of 
島10FA'sinfluence over the aid regime. It should be noted， however， 
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that while this alleged strategic aid emerged to fulfil ]apan's obli-
gations as a member of the Western al1iance following the change 
in international politics in the late 1970 s， economic aid focusing on 
the export promotion to and the natural resource development in 
Asian countries has remained the mainstay of ]apanese foreign aid 
policy. 11 this sense， even if MOFA regail1ed its influence over the 
aid issue， MITl was also l11taintaining a crucial position in the aid 
regl口le.
During the 1980 s， the volume of ]apan's aid increased enor-
l110usly in pace with its record breaking trade surplus. The ten-
year increase in aid between 1976 and 1986 was almost threefold in 
]apanese yen and fourfold in U.S. dollars. ln order to implement ]a-
pan's intent to cooperate with the international community through 
recycling the huge trade surplus， substantial increases in ODA were 
committed through four consecutive plans: the Second ODA Mid-
Term Plan (1981-85)， the Third ODA Mid-Term Plan (1986-87) and 
the Fourth ODA-Mid Terl11 Plan (1988-90). All of these four plans， 
as the first Plan did， have had the objective of doubling the volume 
of ODA over the previous period and were revised downward from 
the expected period. 1n a process of implementing these plans， there 
emerged another variant in the field of foreign economic assistance. 
1n 1987， the ]apanese government decided to re氾ycle$30 billion 
mainly through multilaieral development banks focusing on debt-
ridden countries in Latin America. Also in 1989， prime minister 
Toshiki Kaifu announced that the Export--1mport Bank of ]apan 
would revise downward the $2.05 billion co-financing with the 
World Bank and 1nternational Monetary Fund (IMF) for the Mex-
?????
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Obviously， the main actor which advocated ico debt relief plan. 
these programs was the MOF， because MOF has been the only focal 
point among Japanese ministries to access international financial 
Only MOF could map out the schemes which com-organiza tions. 
bined the increasing ODA， the privately-held huge capital， and the 
technical expertise of international organizations. As in the case qf 
MOF A， the rise of MOF to the implementing stage of aid， which 
used to be simply a dispenser of aid budget， did not tilt the balance 
The consistent 30 per cent share among the ministries concerned. 
of multilateral assistance among total aid since the early 1970 s 
shows that MOFA and MITI have remained in a critical position in 
Actually， both ministries implementing the increasing ODA budget. 
have also been struggling to survive MOF's bold recycling plan in 
different spheres of foreign economic assistance. 
The new Asian Industrial Development (AID) Plan portrays 
A close examination of the MITI's mercantili stic motives clearly. 
AID Plan reveals that MITI stil sets the highest priority on eco-
llomic development in the Asian region for Japan's economic secu酬
The AID Plan， which was proposed by the former Minister of rity. 
MITI， Hajime Tamura， when he visited Bangkok in January 1987， 
was designed to combine economic aid， direct investment， and im目
ports in order to help the recipient countries industrialize rapidly. 
According to a MITI publication， the elements of the New AID 
Plan can be summarized as follows: (1) cooperation would be ex-
?????
tended in the selection and formulation of industrial projects which 
are l110st suitable for the recipient countries; (2) financial and tech-
nological assistance must be directed toward the development of 
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the private industries; (3) the ]apanese market should be opened up 
for the import of manufactured goods from the recipient developing 
countries， and ]apan should help them increase their exports to ]a-
pan; (4)出us，the development promotion of this Plan will go a long 
way toward building an international division of labor between ]a-
pan and Asian countries (MITI， 1987， pp.33-37). Judging from these 
explanations， nothing new， compared with the aid policies in the 
1960 s， can be found in the policy except an emphasis upon白ede-
velopment of the private sector in Asian countries and upon the 
Japanese import of manufacturing goods. In the Plan， the concept 
of economic security means not only securing the stable provision 
of raw materials to ]apan but promoting， as MITI says， the interna-
tional division of labor between Japan and the Asian countries in 
order to accelerate thc adjustment of the ]apanese economic struc-
ture which started with the high appreciation of the Yen in 1985. 
MOF A also showed its intent to keep up with other ministries. 
The ]apanese government announced along with the $30 billion re幡
cycIing plan its intention to increase its non-project， three-year 
grants by $500 million to Sub-Saharan Africa and the least devel-
oped countries. AIso in 1989 it announced another non-project three 
-year $600 million untied grant program to the same region to suc-
ceed an earlier $500 million effort (OECD， 1989， p.167). These were 
designed to help structural adjustment of African countries， and 
曲目efunds were not channeled through international financial or-
ganizations such as the World Bank and IMF， but were extended 
through MOFA， which is dominantly in charge of grant scheme in 
]apanese aid regime. The purpose of these measures was to avoid 
五
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the impression of an undue emphasis on Latin American countries 
in the $30 billion recycling plan. MOF A's position in the aid regime 
cannot be出reateneddecisively by the expansion of MITI and 
MOF's activities unless ]apan gives up the principle of出e“compre-
hensive security." 
In sum， the historical evolution of Japan's aid since its onset 
has shaped the current complex aid regime of three powerful minis-
tries， MOF A， MITI， and MOF， inwhich each ministry has its own 
???
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agenda in carrying out the nation's foreign economic cooperation 
policies. MOF A wishes to maintain a healthy bilateral relationship 
with the United States and other Western allies and to demonstrate 
its contribution to the stability of global political and economic se-
curity; we term the attitude of MOF A“passive globalism." On the 
other hand， MITI dreams of building or reconstruction an Asian-
Pacific economic rim by guiding manufacturing companies， trading 
firms， development consultants and others ;“mercantilistic open -re-
gionalism." MOF， a relative new actor in this field， istrying to 
strengthen and dominate ]apan's relationship with the multilateral 
development banks and， at the same time， prevent other ]apanese 
ministries from encroaching its policy turf;“tactical multilateral-
ism." In this context， the rationale for each policy the Japanese 
government has carried out since the onset of its ODA in 1954 can 
be derived from the constituency of each ministry. MOF A's flexible 
diplomacy based on the bilateral relationship with the United States 
has succeeded in collecting broad support from the people as well 
as the wide range of private business， inspite of the fact that the 
ministry does not have a specific constituency in ]apanese politics. 
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MITI， on the other hand， has made ful use of its policy network 
with private business which was forged during the high economic 
growth era in implementing its policy objectives in aid issues. It is 
easy for MOF for mobiIize the capital of ]apan's banking business 
and to access international financial organizations in carrying out 
its aid policy， since the area of international finance is so closed to 
other political actors due to the high vulnerability of financial flow. 
Therefore， the image of ]apan's aid regime is a well-balanced ag‘ 
gregate entity， rather than the bureaucracy-dominating structure 
without a single responsible body. To keep the balance， two aid for-
mulas have to be maintained. One is the 7-1-1--1 formula， which 
shows the geographical distribution of ]apan's biIateral ODA: 70 
per cent to Asia， 10 per cent to Latin America， 10 per cent to Af-
rica， and 10 per cent to the Middle East; another is the 7-3 for-
mula， the aIIocation ratio between bilateral aid and multilateral aid 
respectively. 
There is no domestic demand to drasticaIly reform the struc-
ture， because the equilibrium of the aid system has been stable 
among the bureaucracy. At a glance， Rix's observation is seem-
ingly true:“A process of slow reform is taking place within the 
]apanese aid system but this is at the working level， not in the over-
aI structure of the system， and there has been no significant move 
to reorganize the aid administration in ]apan， despite the enormous 
size of ]apan's program， the heavy demands on bureaucratic struc-
tures and voices from within and without for this to happen" (Rix， 
1989， p.473). However， every policy maker knows that to upset the 
balance might cause unnecessary domestic poIitical conflict. 
?????
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The alleged complexity of and the hightened expectations for 
J apanese foreign economic cooperation have led to a proposal by 
both political scientists and policy makers in ]apan for establishing 
a single focal point， like the Ministry of Economic Cooperation， in 
order to change Japan's reputation for selfish， free-rider for the 
sake of world peace and economic prosperity (1noguchi， 1985， pp.222 
-30). 1n the same vein， the policy makers have also discussed for a 
long time the possibility of unifying the ministries involved eco-
nomic cooperation. 1n 1964， the First Ad Hoc Commission on Ad-
ministrative reform recommended that the “administration of eco-
nomic cooperation should be coordinated by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Cooperation in the MOF A and should abolish the Economic 
Cooperation Section of the Economic Planning Agency. This pro-
posal reinforced our observation that the early stage of economic 
aid was dominated by MOF A， while MIT1 was gaining power in the 
field from the late 1950 s. MITI's influence was reflected in the pro-
posal which did mention only the abolitIon of only sectIon of the 
Economic Planning Agency. On another occasIon， the Council of 
Foreign Economic Cooperation proposed in 1975 that the Cabinet-
level Conference on Foreign Development and Cooperation be es-
tablished， the existing Council be re-organized， etc. 
The fact that the Council did not propose， although they consid-
ered doing 50 in a process of the final recommendation， the aboli-
tion of redundant 5ections involved in economic cooperation and the 
establishment of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation suggests 
that the aid regime consisting of MOFA， MITI， and MOF was ac-
cepted as a necessary body for implementing policy. 1n the final 
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recommendation in 1982， the Second Ad Hoc Commission on Ad-
ministrative Reform articulated more moderately that the coordina-
tion between ministries concerned should be encouraged. These 
long discussions on the administrative reform in the field of eco・
nomic cooperation has ended up with the setting up in 1988 of a 
cabinet-level Council for Economic Cooperation， consisting of 14 
ministers， a strengthening of staff bo出 in] apan and in overseas 
representations， and the creation of the ]apan International Co-op-
eration System with a view to improving the procurement and 
maintenance of equipment financed wi出 JICA's(Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency) grants and others" (OECD， 1989， p.167). 
4. High Inclusivity in 、Japan'sAid 
The political equilibrium has been further maintained by induding 
a wide range of non-economic actors in policy implementation. Non 
-economic actors such as NGOs， local governments， labor unions， 
and politicians do not sympathize with the idea that ]apanese aid 
policy needs to be directed to realizing national gains. Exduding 
such non-economic actors deepens the degree， and the probabi1ty， 
of cooperation between the govemment and business. They have 
never been involved in policy-making nor have they established col-
laborative relations with the government， like those between busi-
ness and government. However， non-economic actors， when they 
are included， are expected to 'play， at best， supplementary roles in 
the implementation of aid policy. Their involvement has become 
indispensable to implementation of ]apan's aid policy， especially 
when increasing the amount of ]apanese ca:pital had to be recyded 
玉
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to developing countries. 
a. NGO 
There exists an insurmountable perceptual gap between the 
government and the NGOs regarding Japanese development coop-
eration and the roles to be played by voluntary organizations. Gov-
ernment officials universally acぽ ptthe idea that NGOs should sup-
plement government efforts (JANIC News， no.1， April 25， 1988， pp.5 
-6 and no.2 October 1， 1988， p.3; Sogo Kenkyu Kaihatsu Kiko， 1990， 
p.67). In 1987， MOF A's affiliate organization， the Association for 
Promotion of International Cooperation (APIC)， researched the 
roles played by NGOs among OECD countries and issued a report 
that suggested building “supplementary" (hokanteki) relations be-
tween Japanese NGOs and the government (APIC， 1987). On the 
other hand， Japanese NGOs criticize the government's policy as 
“trilaterally incorporated (sanmi ittai)"--integrating ODA， natural 
resource development， and export promotion into one set of policy 
goals--and maintain出atdevelopment cooperation should contrib-
ute to the development of“humanitarian interests on an universal 
scale." For Japanese NGO宮， the government's offers of increased fi-
nancing， especially since 1988 when the Fourth Mid-term Plan of 
ODA advocated strengthening NGO activities， have been “unilat-
eral" actions， and the government has never shown any intention to 
“work together." For example， the NGO proposal to eliminate de-
tailed administrative conditions for project designs and to introduce 
multiple-fiscal year disbursements to NGO projects never attracted 
serious attention from the government， because such reforms would 
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transform existing aid institutions and budgetary systems (JANIC， 
1992， pp.8-11; 1990， p.3白4;1989， p.14). 
The arm's-length relationship between the government and 
NGOs is attributable both to poorly institutionalized communica-
tions and to the decentralized structure of ]apanese NGOs. Despite 
the complex and acentric structure of the policy-making proce明，
only MOF A has offered opportunities for policy dialogs between 
the government and ]apanese NGOs. Most ministries want to avoid 
institutionalizing NGO participation in state policy because they 
need to use NGOs as cash-dispensers that supplement governmental 
organizations such as OECF and ]lCA. Thus， while the ]apanese 
government began supporting NGOs in 1972， when the problem of 
boat people from Vietnam became controversial， dialog between 
the Foreign Ministry and ]apanese NGOs， was not institutionalized 
until the mid-1980 s. Official communication began only in 1984， 
when the Aid Policy Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau， 
出eMOFA， informally established a forum for policy discussion 
with ]apanese NGOs. ln the next year， the informal channel became 
a formal council， the NGO-MOFA Aid Council (NGO-Gaz'musho 
Kankeisha Kondankai)， inwhich MOF A officials， who are specially 
assigned to NGO matters (NGO tantokan)， meet ]apanese NGO 
workers regularly and exchange views about ]apanese foreign aid 
policies. The MOFA began intensive financial support of NGOs af-
ter the Fourth ODA Doubling Plan， announced in 1988， included 
strengthening relationships with NGOs as a policy goal. As recogni-
tion of NGO activities has increased in international aid regim田， so 
has government support. A government-sponsored NGO Forum was 
? ?
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held in Tokyo and Okayama in 1993. In 1994， a new division in 
charge of NGOs and other private aid activitiesらtheNon←Govern. 
mental Organizations Assistance Division， was created within the 
Economic Cooperation Bureau， and three NGO staff members were 
dispatched to the 1994 UN Population and Development Conference 
as members of the official delegation (Japan's ODA， 1994， p.227; 
Asahi Shimbur1， August 20 and 26日1994，13 th ed.， p.3 and p.2). Yet 
the inclusion of ]apanese NGOs in policy implementation has been 
made possible because of political opportunities created by the in圃
ternationalization of the ]apanese economy， not because of domes-
tic institutional change. Thus the participation of ]apanese NGOs 
has not affected the size or direction of ]ap叩lesedevelopment coop-
eration. 
The weak centralization of ]apanese NGOs at the nationallevel 
has also kept them outside of the policy community. There are 
only two umbrella organizations of ]apanese NGOs--the ]apan 
NGO Center for International Cοoperation (JANIC) in Tokyo and 
the Kansai Council for International Cooperation (1(，仰saiKo.ゐtsai
Kyoηoku Ky都知i)一一 andneither considers the coordination and 
repr田 entationof NGO activities and interests a major objective. 
They simply serve as“∞ntact points" where individual citizen 
NGOs can meet and hold conferences. Furthermore， few citi詑 n
NGOs are interested in joining the umbrella organizations. For ex-
ample， ]ANIC's membership included only 52 organizations and 257 
individuals as of 1992 (JANIC NeW空， no.15， ]anuary 10， 1993， p.3). 
There are aIso no institutional linkages between the NGOs and po・
litical parties or labor unions. This lack of centralization makes it 
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difficult for individual NGOs to raise funds. 1n 1990， ]apanese 
NGO巴 raisedonly $100 million， whiIe their German counterparts 
colIected $760 million. As a result， inthe early 1990 s ]apanese 
NGOs' depended on the government for as much as 40 percent of 
their current expenses， twice the German ratio; in 1986， 2，400 ]apa-
nese volunteers serving overseas were wholly or partly financed by 
official aid agencies， while onJy 1，700 Germans were simiIarly sup-
ported. ]apanese NGOs' reliance on pubJic money has been remark-
ably high (Nishigaki and Shimomura， 1993， p.263;堕皇室生担1no 
Sel如 Kaihatsuh担， ]okan， 1993， p.277; OECD， 1988， p.153). 
b. Local Government 
Like the NGOs， ]apanese local governments have played a sup-
plemental role in executing policy. While they have been excluded 
from policy formulation， they have been indispensable in imple-
menting technical cooperation. Under a 1987 law， the central gov-
ernment pays local governments a major part of the costs of send-
ing officials to developing countries as administrative or engineer-
ing experts. Moreover， the subsidies are mainJy alIocated at the 
prefectural Jevel， where the central government can exercise its in匂
fluence more easily than at the city or community level (Furihata， 
1995， p.41). The national government feels that local government 
participation contriblltes to the international commllnity both dト
rectly and through the “internationalization" of ]apanese communi-
ties. The central government also believes that sllch cooperation 
will eventually benefit the local communities. The Ministry of 
Home Affairs once“!，:ruided" local governments to the idea that: 
?
?
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“activities related to international exchanges by local govern-
ments…should in principIe aim at estabIishing regional identities as 
well as promoting regional industries and economies" (Matsushita， 
1988， pp.255-90). Local government participation in development 
cooperation is based not upon social initiatives， but upon state in-
ducement. 
?
?
?
c. General PubIic 
The J apanese pubIic's participation in aid poIicy， ifthere has 
been any since the drastic poIicy change of the 1970 s， has also been 
1imited to implementation. The general public contributes chiefly 
through the postal savings system. The Voluntary Deposit for In-
ternational Aid program aIIows Japanese savers to withhold a part 
of the interモstaccrued to their acεounts and dona臼 itto Japanese 
NGOs. The number of participants has steadily increased since the 
program was established by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommu-
nications in 1991. There were 10 million， or 13 percent of 80 miIlion 
depositors， contributing in January 1993， which was almost as many 
Japanese as went overseas as tourists that year. In 1的1the pro-
gram distributed Y 2.3 billion to 185 Japanese NGOs， in1994， Y 2.5 
billion to 197 NGOs， which came to， on average， Y 12 miIlion for 
each organization. This amount probably dominates the funding of 
Japanese NGOs， considering出atmore than 40 percent of Japanese 
NGOs have capital funds of less than Y 5 million (Kokusai Kaihatsu 
Janaru， March 1993， p.16; JANIC News no.13， August 25， 1992; 
Asahi Shimbul1， August 3， 1994， 13 th ed.， p.4.). Due to the postal 
savings system， contributions by Japanese to developing countries 
? ?
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have been steadily if silently increasing. However， this indirect par-
ticipation in NGO activities may have resulted in ]apan's extremely 
low pぽ capitacοntributions to NGOs， only $0.9 in 1989， incontrast 
to Germany's $11.3 (OECD， 1990， p.7η. 
Outside of the postal saving system， few ]apanese involve 
themselves in development cooperation policy. Almost no ]ap叩 1回e
know出atthe government has hosted an annual “Overseas Eco-
nomic Cooperation Festival (Kaigai Keizai Kyoryoku Kyocho 
Undo)" since 1964， or that October 6， the Day of 1nternational Coop-
eration， commemorates the day ]apan joined the Colombo Plan of 
1954 and launched its official foreign aid policy. And the eventsヲ
parades， lectures， and exhibitions held in Tokyo on that day do not 
provide any access to the policy-making process. 
1n spite of the public's lack of voice， its support for foreign aid 
policy has been high. Almost 80 percent of ]apanese have consis-
tently supported the policy since白.elate 1970 s and agreed出at]a-
pan“should promote [foreign aid] further" or “should maintain the 
curre叫 level."The general public agrees that foreign economic as-
sistance is an international public good出atworks to sustain peace 
and prosperity. Objectives such as encouraging the “stability of de-
veloping countries" and “world peace" were supported by 46 per・
cent of ]apanese， surpassing“humanitarian reasons，" 40 percent， 
“transferring ]apan's experience，" 32 percent， or“diplomacy，" 23 
percent (Sorifu Naikaku Soridaijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu， 1993， p.17; 
1mai and Okamoto， 1992， p.47). Thus the general public has never 
opposed the accelerating liberalization of foreign aid. 
?
?
?
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d. Politicians 
?
?
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Politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) show litle 
inclination to po!iticize aid po!icy， because most influential mem-
bers enjoy the fringe benefits of presiding over bilateral parliamen-
tary friendship committees with major recipients of ]apanese ODA. 
LDP politicians have， ineffect， been rent凶seekerswho take advan-
tage of the complex and costly economic transactions associated 
with ] apanese ODA; they are not policy-makers seeking to limit 
Japan's systemic vulnerability and obtain national gains. LDP pol-
icy proposals， ifany， have reproduced the government's policy. 
Thus， the Special Committee for External Economic Assistance 
(Taigai Keizai /(yoηo!?u To!?ubetsu lin!?ai)， under the Policy Research 
Council of the LDP， fundamentally agrees with the internationaliza-
tion of ]apan (Jiyu Minshuto Seimu Chosakai， 1993; Jiyu Minshuto， 
1992). At least until 1993， Diet sessions， dominated by the LDP， 
ritualistically approved the total ODA budget while posing a few 
questions about details， even though ODA accounted for a much 
larger share of the budget than did subsidies paid to small and me-
clium-sized enterprises， one of the most politicizecl buclget items. 
The disinterest shown by LDP members in foreign policy in general 
and economic cooperation in particular derived from the marginal 
effects of clevelopment policy on election campaigns_ There are no 
informal support caucuses (zoleu giin) for development cooperation， 
while areas such as construction， commerce and distribution， social 
welfare， agriculture and so forth， are characterized by the pork bar-
rel politics of claily policy making (Inoguchi and Iwai， 1987， pp.103-
112). Some young politicians clicl call themselves a caucus for eco目
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nomic cooperation， but they made no attempt to participate sub-
stantially in policy-making. Instead， using words such as“interde-
pendence，"“beyond ideology，" or “J apan as a trading state，"出ey
confirmed the government's views， and used discussions of eco・
nomic cooperation policy to prepare for influence in domestic issues 
in出enear future (Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru， January/February 
1989， pp.21-30， 87-90; April 1987， pp.96-101). 
The most influential politicians maintained constituencies 
within developing countries receiving large amounts of aid. As 
many journalists and radical scholars have pointed out， they may 
use formal or informal bilateral friendship leagues with aid recipi-
ents to play intermediary roles between developing countries' gov-
ernments and Japanese and foreign multinational companies. As 
chairmen， they visit developing countries， meet ministers and high 
raking officials， receive unofficial requests for financial support for 
projects， and exert pr田 Sぽ eon bureaucrats. It is reported that such 
intermediation is usually paid for by private companies and govern-
ments of developing countries. As of December 1988， most senior 
LDP members， those elected more than 10 times， maintained over司
seas constituencies: Indonesia for Michio Watanabe， China for Ma-
soyoshi Ito， South Korea for Takeo Fukuda， Turkey for Shin Kane-
maru， the Arab countries and Vietnam for Yoshio恥Sakurauchi，and 
Mexico for Masumi Ezaki (Sentaku， April 1989， pp.68-71). 
These bosses， however， have had litle influence on， or been 
hardly interested in， foreign aid policies such as the size of eco・
nomic assistance received by specific countries or the liberalizaticm 
of tied aid_ A MITI official once said，“We get very litle interfer-
?
?
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ence" (Inada， 1989 a， p.196; Orr， 1990， p.22). Since no regular chan-
nels exist for consultation between politicians and the government 
on economic cooperation， political pressure has been brought to 
bear directly on policy-making in only a limited number of cases. 
A Brazilian case is outstanding as an example of a direct linkage 
between political gains and the politicization of aid policy. In thβ 
late 1970 s， when the “Brazil Boom" emerged in the Japanese busi-
ness community， the LDP's Japan-Brazil Agricultural Development 
Parliamentary League (Nit仰kuNogyo Kaihatsu Giin Kondankai) 
pressured the Ministry of Finance to make it possible for JICA to 
extend direct development financing to an agricultural joint venture 
of a consortium of Japanese firms and the Brazilian government. 
The key politician backing the project was Tatsuo Tanaka， whose 
constituency was in the Yamaguchi prefecture， from which many 
Japanese had emigrated to Brazil (Kokusai Kaihatsu J anaru， Febru-
ary 1976， pp.lO-14). But， unless large electoral gains have seemed 
likely， most LDP members have maintained a low profile and， while 
deveJoping overseas constituencies， have not become. directJy in-
volved aid policy making. 
Non-LDP politicians， especialIy socialists， who have demanded 
disc10sure of the detai!s of development projects have been ex-
cluded from both the formulation and implementation of aid poJicy. 
And so far， both the low profile of influential politicians and the 
き s凶
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t“ωi句onof Japan'、spolicy h加av刊ecreated no opportunity for opposition 
parties to politicize the issue Il). the Diet. The most controversial 
points raised by the opposition parties have been over the process， 
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which skips Diet discussions and totally rules out information shar 
ing with political party members (Takatsuka， 1990; Iwaki， 1985). 
The Socialists have called for streamlining the bureaucracy by es-
tablishing a centralized， unitary millistry for development coopera四
tion. Such a ministry， according to Socialist Party members， should 
be charged with explaining， before Diet members， the detai!s of de-
velopment projects and obtaining approval for funding for each pro-
ject， as is done in the United States Congress. The opposition be-
gan its challenge in 1974， and several times in the late 1980 s， itsub-
mitted a bil called “Basic Law for International Development Co-
operation" to the Diet. The ]apan Trade Union Confederation 
(JTUC， Rengo) joined the Socialists and supported the Basic Law， 
which calls for labor participation in policy-making (Nihon Rodo 
Kumiai So Rengokai， 1993). However， attempts to centralize policy 
-making around the Diet have borne no fruit. Even the opposition 
victory in the 1989 elections to the House of Councilors and the end 
of LDP dominance of the Diet in 1993 did not result in passage of 
the bill. 
Further， the government argues出atdetai!s of projects， especially 
loan agreements with developing countries， are not international 
treaties that require the Diet's approval. Project agreements are 
simply financial contracts based on constructive laws (junkyo-ho) 
that stipulate the legal status of governmental financial institutions 
such as OECF and the Exim Bank， and， just as private banks must 
take responsibility for the confidentiality of customer information， 
the ]apanese government cannot disclose to the public any informa司
tion regarding loan agreements with developing countries (Sumi， 
五
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1992). 
1n the same context， efforts by the opposition to strengthen 
Japanese authority to audit developing countries' use of Japanese 
ODA have achieved litle success. 1n 1986， scandals such as aid cor-
ruption under the Marcos regime in the Philippines and several inci回
dents of bribery related to .nCA procurement procedures increasecl 
public scepticism， and the opposition managed to create a special 
investigation committee. 1n response， the Japanese government es-
tablished the Foreign Affairs Audit Division in the Board of Audit 
to examine the use of ODA and， in1987， set up the Management 
and Coordination Agency to inspect the efficiency and effectiveness 
of aid administration. However， the government has consistently 
maintained that the sovereignty of recipient countries and Japan's 
policy of promoting self-help allow Japanese audits of the use of 
Japanese ODA only if the recipient government approves the inves-
tigation (N akagawa， 1993). 1n short， the disclosure of project and 
financial information within the parliamentary system that has been 
long advocated by non-LDP politicians has been the least plausible 
of proposed reforms， because it would diminish cooperation be回
tween government and business in formulating comprehensive eco-
nomic cooperation. 
To summarize， Japan's aid policy has been formulated and im-
plemented by collective action between the government and busi-
5 同 Thesearrar 
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era because aid policy-making has been c∞onf五inedto economic a抗c-
tors sharing an interest in ach~eving national gains， and has ex-
cluded those who seel王toachieve development values or to obtain 
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rent from ODA. When international opportunities have been 
opened for those excluded actors to participate in economic coop-
eration， albeit limited to implementation stages， their inclusion has 
constrained politicization of the aid issues in the Japanese policy 
com紅1Unity.
5. Conclusion 
To conclude， we need to answer the question set in the beginning: 
what political economy model can explain the policy making proc-
ess in the field of foreign economic assistance?“Japan Inc." is an 
inappropriate conception because it fails to explain the high inclu-
sivity of aid issue.“Bureaucratic statism" ignores the reciprocal re】
lationship between the government and private sectors. We can not 
adopt the “plularism" model either， because the issue does not be-
come politicized in respective policy arenas. As an alternative， we 
argue that the “societal state" model by Daniel Okimoto best dem拘
onstrates the dynamics of J apan's foreign economic assistance. Ac-
cording to this model， the non-politicized character of aid due to 
the high inclusivity is part of a generalization that， in J apan，“State 
and society form mutually reinforcing parts of a whole" (Okimoto， 
1988， p.310). He continues that: 
“Perhaps Japan can be characterized as a 'network，' a 'rela-
tional， or a 'societal，' state in the sense that government 
power is intertwined with that of the private sector. The 
government's power hinges on its capacity to work effec-
tively with the private sector， with each side making an ef-
fort to take into account the needs and objectives of the 
other. Political power in Japan is thus exercised through a 
?
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complex process of public--private sector interaction， involv-
ing subtle give-and-take， not frontal confrontation that re-
sults in the forceful imposition of one side's wiI1 on the other" 
(Okimoto， 1988， p.314). 
In the field of J apan's foreign economic assistance， the distinc-
tion between state and society that is useful in examining European 
case conceals elements of state strength that derive from a struc-
tural integration of state and society in Japan. This integration 
makes it possible for Japan's government to retain vast influence in 
a reciprocal relationship with business and other private actors 
even in an era of internationalization and liberalization. 
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